This note is intended to reconcile the two most widely used approaches to quantitative evolutionary theory: exact population genetic analysis and purely phenotypic analysis commonly cast in terms of population game theory or evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). To this end, we introduce a dichotomy between long-and short-term evolution. The latter is the domain of most population genetic theory while the former provides a paradigm to connect population genetics with population game theory. Convergence to an ESS in multilocus genetic in systems is discussed in terms of long-term evolution.
An ESS has beende ned in two ways: First, by Maynard Smith and Price 1 and later by Maynard Smith 2 , following Hamilton 3 , as a strategy (e.g., a distribution of phenotypes) which, once xed in the population, is immune to invasion by any alternative strategy. Second, by Bishop and Cannings 4 and by Maynard Smith 5 in the more familiar game-theory form, as a strategyp such that for any alternative strategy p, the two following conditions are satis ed:
A(i) V (p p) V (p p) and in case of equality i n A(i):
A(ii) V (p p) > V (p p), where V (x y) is some evolutionarily relevant p a yo (e.g. tness or inclusive tness) accruing to an individual of strategy x in a population with a mean strategy y.
In the case of a random-encounter population game, A(i) and A(ii) together are equivalent to the requirement that for any strategy p alternative top, there is a positive value " > 0 such that if at least a fraction 1 ; " of the population chooses the strategyp and the rest of the population chooses the mutant strategy p, then the average payo to the residentp-players is strictly higher than that to the mutant p-player individuals. Thus, in using conditions A(i) and A(ii) there is a tacit assumption that natural selection operates at each generation to increase the relative frequency of any strategy which yields a payo V higher than the average of the population at that generation.
Unfortunately, for complex genetic systems, that is, those involving multiple loci with epistasis and recombination, this is not true even when the payo is measured in terms of individual viability. In fact, even under frequencyindependent selection in a multilocus system with recombination, the average viability of the population does not necessarily increase 6 , and it might be suspected that frequency-dependent selection would only aggravate the situation.
It has been suggested elsewhere 7;14 , that the appropriate dynamics relevant for the concept of ESS as a strategy immune to all possible mutations is that of \trial and error," in which the population is carried from one short-term stable state to another as a result of new mutations being introduced into the system. We call this process long-term evolution, to distinguish it from the well-studied process of changes in the genotype frequencies of a given nite set of genotypes, which we refer to as short-term evolution. Long-term evolution is a process whereby successful mutations invade the population, renewing the process of short-term evolution towards a new stable equilibrium, cycle or state of chaos. When the short-term dynamics result in a stable equilibrium, and if successful mutations are rare relative to the time it takes to reach equilibrium, we m a y postulate that new mutations occur near the stable equilibria of the short-term process.
Contrary to an implicit working assumption dating back to Fisher 18 , and tacitly adopted without examination by mainstream students of qualitative e v olution, the laws governing long-term evolution cannot possibly be extrapolated from results obtained for the short-term process: The two processes are qualitatively di erent from one another. One di erence between short-term and long-term evolution, which is the subject of the present article, concerns the tendency of a multilocus genetic system in the long-term process, but not in the short-term, to approach a phenotypic optimum under the operation of frequency-independent selection and an ESS (when it exists) under frequency-dependent selection.
In principle, if the distribution of mutations were known, then the probability law governing the transition from one short-term equilibrium (or cycle, or state of chaos) to the next could bededuced. From this perspective long-term evolution is a stochastic process over the space of possible \states" to which short-term evolution carries the population. Unfortunately, the transition law governing this process is generally not known. However, under deterministic short-term evolution, knowledge of the genetic structure and the selection parameters is su cient to determine which mutations cannot succeed in the long-term sense these determine zero-probability transitions. Surprisingly, this information is su cient to obtain quite strong results concerning the limiting behavior of long-term evolution. In order to characterise this limiting behaviour we rst introduce some useful stability criteria.
Long-Term Evolution, Long-Term Stability, External Stability and Phenotypic Stability
The following de nitions are used throughout the discussion.
De nition 1. (Ref. 9) A set ; of short-term stable genetic equilibria is said to be externally stable if, starting from any genetic equilibrium in ;, the long-term process of evolution allows passage only to another state in ;.
Recall that the long-term process of evolution can be de ned as a Markovian stochastic process over the set of all short-term stable genetic equilibria. Hence we state
De nition 1 0 . An absorbing set of states for the process of long-term evolution is said to be an externally stable set. 
Equivalently
De nition 2 0 . A s t r ategy p is said to be phenotypically stable if it is phenotypically determined by each state within a given absorbing set of states for the process of long term evolution.
Note, however, that unlike in a nite-state Markovian process, the attainable sample space of the process we are dealing with (say, all short-term stable genetic equilibria) does not guarantee convergence to an absorbing set. Thus, an asexual evolutionary model has recently been constructed 15 , in which all ESS's are phenotypically stable strategies but only those which satisfy some additional criteria (i.e., continuous stability) are attainable with positive probability from states in their vicinity (in which case, convergence occurs in probability 1). We are, therefore, interested mainly in the following property:
De nition 3. A strategy p is said to be long-term stable if for any vicinity S of p, starting from any genetic equilibrium that phenotypically generates a population strategy close enough to p, the long-term process will not leave S and, moreover, will converge to p with probability one.
Long-Term Selection and Two-Locus Population Genetics
Consider a two-locus random mating diploid genetic system with alleles A 1 A 2 : : : A n at one locus and B 1 B 2 : : : B m at the other and recombination rate R(0 < R 1=2) between the loci 9 . (A generalization to mutiple loci was made by Liberman 16 .) Assume now that the various genotypes in the population di er from each other only in their probabilities of choosing the pure strategies 1 : : : r in an r r random-encounter population game (the case r = 1 standing for frequency-independent selection over a single phenotype). Let p (ijk`) be the strategy vector of the genotype
That is, genotype A i B k =A j B`chooses strategy r with probability p r (ijk`). Also let the payo to a p player when encountering a q player bea positive bi-linear function V (p q). Denote by x = (x ik ) the vector of frequencies of the chromosomes A i B k after selection and recombination. Using the Hardy-Weinberg Law we know that the mean population strategy of newborn o spring will be p = Now assume that mutations occur at random at each of the loci. We make n o speci c assumption about the distribution of e ects of a single mutation on the phenotype of its carriers and assume only: B(i) Mutations having any e ect on a resident genotype are possible in the long run. B(ii) The rate of mutation to alleles that invade the population is low enough to guarantee that after an advantageous mutation arises, short-term convergence occurs to a small neighborhoodof a stable equilibrium before there is a new advantageous mutation.
We suppose that a new allele A n+1 appears at a low frequency near the equilibrium fx ik g. and p (n+1) is the mean strategy of a random mutant after the distribution of the mutant chromosomes has reached the limit u. Indeed, w = V (p p ) and we therefore have 9 Proposition 1 A necessary condition for the initial increase of allele A n+1 is that the mean strategy p (n+1) of the rare mutant genotypes be at least as good as the population average strategy p when playing against p . That is
A su cient condition for initial increase of A n+1 is that 8] holds as a strict inequality.
As a special case, we get Proposition 2 A su cient condition for the initial increase of allele A n+1 under frequency-independent selection is that A n+1 initially increases the population's average tness. A necessary condition is that it does not decrease it.
Proposition 2 may b e i n terpreted as a somewhat weaker long-term version of Fisher's fundamental theorem 18 , which holds in this case for multilocus genetic systems. As an immediate result of Proposition 1, we obtain (see also ref 12 Proof. First we see that a phenotypically stable strategy, if it exists, must bea best response against itself. This is so because if the population mean strategy p were not a best response to p in the phenotypic game, then another strategy, s, must exist such that V (s p ) > V (p p ), in which case it follows from Proposition 1 that a mutant determining the strategy s will initially increase in the population.
But if the population mean strategy p is a bestresponse to p and is not an ESS in the phenotypic game, it follows from the de nition of ESS that another strategy s must exist such that V (s s) V (p s). In such a case, a dominant mutation A n+1 which (monomorphically) generates the strategy s, regardless of the alleles at the other locus, can become established in the population and p cannot possibly bephenotypically stable.
For the case of frequency-independent selection, it immediately follows, that a necessary as well as su cient condition for a phenotype to be phenotypically stable is that it brings the tness of its carrier to an optimum.
Long-Term Stability of an ESS
An important question still to beaddressed concerns whether the long-term process, once in the vicinity of an ESSp, will converge top. Here we focus on two cases: a two strategy population game and frequency-independent selection. The problem of long-term stability o f the ESS when more than two strategies are involved remains open even for the case of asexual population dynamics.
For a two strategy population game, we k n o w that an ESSp either (Case I) is a strict best response against itself or (Case II)itsatis es the equality V (p p) = V (p p) for all p 6 =p, in which case it must satisfy also the inequality V (p p) < V (p p). We start with Case II which is possibly more interesting because it always applies whenp is a mixed strategy. It was also conjectured 10 to be the more di cult case for which to prove stability. Surprisingly, the opposite is true, and long-term stability of the so called weak ESS is always guaranteed. This is because in case II,theselection forces operating on the population can bechosen as weak as one wishes, provided the population is su ciently close to the ESS.
We apply results of Nagylaki 19 20 to the e ect that for any positive recombination rate, as the maximum selection di erential approaches zero, short-term selection will take the linkage disequilibrium to the order of the square of the selection di erentials. Further, Nagylaki has shown that for any xed set of w ijk( e.g. for frequency-independent selection), if the linkage disequilibrium is small enough, then for chromosome frequencies fx ik g in one generation, and fx 0 ik g in the next generation,
where the x 0 ik are de ned in eqn 3].
Inequality 9] is true as a mathematical statement regardless of how fw ijk`g are interpreted. In Nagylaki's analysis, w ijk`w ere understood as xed tnesses so that 9] was interpreted in the sense that the average tness must increase over time. But 9] 
is the population strategy after selection, recombination and random mating. This can besummarized as Theorem 2. Ifp is an ESS which is not a strict best response against itself, and if the population strategy p determined by the two locus genetic model is su ciently close top, then after one generation the population strategy p 0 is a better response against p than p i.e.
But for a population game with two pure strategies if its dynamic satis es 10], then starting from a population strategy close to an ESS, short-term dynamics will eventually bring the population to the ESS, if genetically available, or to a strategy which is the closest possible genetically available to the ESS 21 . As a result, we have Theorem 3. If a two-strategy ESS exists, which is not strictly a best response against itself, it is phenotypically stable and long-term stable in a two-locus genetic system with selection and random mating. Surprisingly, the situation is more complicated in Case I, namely that of an ESS (inevitably pure) which is strictly a best response against itself or equivalently a strict optimum under frequency-independent selection. From Proposition 1, it then follows 9 that in a two-locus random mating genetic system, a new mutation will invade if it initially brings the phenotypic value of its carriers closer to the optimum or to the ESS respectively. Once a new mutation invades, however, our analysis is not informative as to whether the nal state to which the subsequent short-term process moves must produce a distribution of phenotypes which is actually closer to the ESS (or to the optimum). If true, this result would entail that starting from the vicinity of an ESS, the long-term process should converge monotonically to the ESS with probability one, regardless of the distribution of the mutations (given only the general assumptions A(i) and A(ii) above). This result holds under weak selection on the phenotypic trait or in the population game in question. For a xed positive rate of recombination, the argument goes straightforwardly as just employed.
It is somewhat surprising that with strong selection, this result is not generally true. Recent numerical simulations have shown that that even under frequencyindependent selection, initial increase of the average tness of the population, concomitant with the establishment of a new mutation, may be followed by a decrease of the average tness below its initial value 22 . However, this appears to occur in a rather small fraction of cases, and, with a random choice of the e ect of the mutation we conjecture that the expected change in tness from one equilibrium to the other tends to be always positive. If this is the case, with probability one the stochastic long-term process must always approach an arbitrarily small neighborhoodof the phenotypic optimum, if it exists. Whether the same results hold for the case of a strict pure ESS is under investigation. For example, in the coordination game, it appears that near a pure strategy, the tness di erence between the mean strategy and a mutant may be su ciently great to cause further departure of the population strategy from the ESS.
Phenotypic Stability of the ESS with Multiple Loci and with any Number of Strategies
If the ESS is strictly the best response against itself, then it immediately follows from Proposition 1 that the set of genetic equilibria that phenotypically determine the ESS is externally stable. Note, however, that only a pure strategy can be a strict best response against itself. Weissing (personal communication) has shown that the set of all genetic equilibria that phenotypically determine the ESS is not always externally stable with more than two strategies involved in the ESS, an invading mutant m a y shift the population to an ever increasing cycle away from the ESS. Hammerstein and Selten 10 and later Hammerstein 12 suggested that the set of all phenotypically monomorphic genetic equilibria that phenotypically generate the ESS is actually externally stable (in which case, according to the de nition given above, the ESS would indeed bephenotypically stable). Besides some problems with Hammerstein and Selten's proof, Hammerstein's later mathematical statement w as much weaker than this, and actually claims that the set of all phenotypically monomorphic equilibria that generate the ESS is stable against some, but by no means all, mutations that can shift the population out of this set 23 . Instead, we prove Theorem 4. Letp be a f u l l y m i x e d ESS with any number of pure s t r ategies. Then (i) The set ; of all genetic equilibria that phenotypically generate the ESSp as a population strategy, each of which includes at least one double homozygote that phenotypically generatesp as its own strategy, is externally stable. (ii) The mixed ESSp is, therefore, phenotypically stable.
Proof. Let G be any genetic equilibrium that phenotypically generatesp as a mean population strategy including a positive frequency x 1111 of the double homozygote A 1 B 1 =A 1 B 1 which, by itself, phenotypically generatesp. Now consider a m utant allele that, when introduced into the population at low frequency, shifts the average strategy away fromp. Let the population strategy after the intro-
